Should central banks lean against changes in asset prices? by Sylvain Leduc & Jean-Marc Natal
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 
Should Central Banks Lean Against  
Changes in Asset Prices? 
 
Sylvain Leduc 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
 
Jean-Marc Natal 





Working Paper 2011-15 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2011/wp11-15bk.pdf 
The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be 
interpreted as reflecting the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the 



















  Should Central Banks Lean Against
Changes in Asset Prices? ∗
Sylvain Leduc†and Jean-Marc Natal‡
May 2011
Abstract
How should monetary policy be conducted in the presence of endogenous feedback
loops between asset prices, ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial health, and economic activity? We reconsider
this question in the context of the ﬁnancial accelerator model and show that, when the
level of natural output is ineﬃcient, the optimal monetary policy under commitment leans
considerably against movements in asset prices and risk premia. We demonstrate that an
endogenous feedback loop is crucial for this result and that price stability is otherwise
quasi-optimal absent this feature. We also show that the optimal policy can be closely
approximated and implemented using a speed-limit rule that places a substantial weight
on the growth of ﬁnancial variables.
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11 Introduction
How should monetary policy be conducted in the presence of endogenous feedback loops between
asset prices, ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial health, and economic activity? In a series of papers, Bernanke and
Gertler [1999, 2001] argued that aggressive inﬂation-targeting rules perform best in the presence
of large movements in asset prices that then aﬀect credit-constrained ﬁrms.1 Central banks
should thus react to movements in asset prices to the extent that they aﬀect the forecast for
inﬂation over the medium run. Yet, the recent ﬁnancial crisis has to some extent weakened this
policy prescription. Indeed, many policymakers have acknowledged that the ﬁnancial turmoil
has reﬁned their views on the role of asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy.2 Consistent
with this introspection, the minutes of the November 2009 Federal Open Market Committee
meeting, for instance, revealed that some Committee members were concerned that keeping the
f e d e r a lf u n d sr a t et o ol o wf o rt o ol o n gc ould lead to excessive risk-taking in ﬁnancial markets.
In this paper, we reconsider the role of asset prices and ﬁnancial variables in general in the
implementation of monetary policy using the ﬁnancial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist [BGG, 1999]. In this framework, entrepreneurs need external sources of funding to
ﬁnance investment and their level of net worth aﬀects their cost of capital. By directly aﬀecting
entrepreneurs’ net worth, swings in asset prices aﬀect the cost of credit ﬁnancing and tend to
amplify movements in investment. In contrast to the work of Bernanke and Gertler [1999,
2001] and Gilchrist and Leahy [2002], who focused on simple interest rate rules, we emphasize
the design of optimal monetary policy under commitment and study its impact on asset prices
and risk premia (external ﬁnance premium, in the words of BGG). We show that the optimal
policy deviates substantially from perfect inﬂation targeting — the canonical New Keynesian
benchmark — and instead leans considerably against asset prices and/or changes in risk premia.
In this economy, the feedback loop that connects asset prices, net worth, risk premia,
leverage, investment and leads back to asset prices — the so-called ﬁnancial accelerator — is cru-
cial to understanding the optimal design of monetary policy. As the tightness of the ﬁnancial
1Cecchetti et al. [2000] present an opposing view.
2See, for instance, Yellen [2009], Stern [2009], and Hoenig [2010].
2constraint varies with the state of the business cycle (a central feature of the ﬁnancial acceler-
ator), so does the degree of ineﬃciency of natural output, i.e., the level of output that ensures
perfect price stability. In this context, price stability is suboptimal. The central bank leans
against swings in asset prices and excessive changes in risk premia because doing so reduces
ineﬃcient ﬂuctuations in output. Hence, optimal monetary policy trades oﬀ volatility in the
inﬂation rate for a more eﬃcient allocation of production. The trade-oﬀ is particularly acute
when the economy is hit by ﬁnancial shocks. We experiment with two types of shocks that have
been emphasized in the literature as potential drivers of the business cycle: a net worth shock
and a risk shock (see Christiano et al. [2003, 2010] and Gilchrist and Leahy [2002]).
The presence of an endogenous feedback loop between asset prices and economic ﬂuctua-
tions — through net worth and leverage — is crucial for optimal policy to lean against asset price
movements and changes in risk premia. Absent large endogenous movements in asset prices
(when the capital stock is not costly to adjust, for instance), we show that the optimal policy
closely follows the standard prescription to stabilize prices. Only when ﬁnancial ﬂuctuations
are signiﬁcant enough to lead to substantial ineﬃciencies in the equilibrium allocations does
optimal policy mitigate movements in asset prices and other ﬁnancial variables. This result
points to the importance of incorporating capital accumulation in the model to generate po-
tentially large endogenous movements in asset prices and net worth and to consider economies
in which the natural and eﬃcient allocations diﬀer markedly.
In terms of implementability, we show that in practice the optimal policy can be closely
approximated by simple speed-limit interest rate rules (in the spirit of Walsh [2003]) that place
a considerable weight on the growth of ﬁnancial variables in response to real or ﬁnancial shocks.
These rules have the advantage of relying solely on observables, as only the growth rates of the
variables in the rule need to be known. They do not require undue knowledge about the eﬃcient
levels of variables in the rule, which are typically diﬃcult to assess, particularly so in the case
of ﬁnancial variables.3 We consider a rule that includes the change in the external ﬁnance
premium, but our results are similar if we instead include alternative measures such as the
3Interest rate rules including a change in asset prices have also been studied by Gilchrist and Saito [2008] in
a model with imperfect information, and by Tetlow [2006] under model uncertainty.
3changes in equity prices or net worth. In the midst of the ﬁnancial crisis, many policymakers
also advanced the idea of looking at credit growth as a possible indicator of ﬁnancial excess
(see, e.g., Mishkin [2008]). Including this variable in our simple speed-limit rule allows a close
approximation of the allocation under the optimal policy as well. We ﬁnd that the optimized
interest rate rule (the one that best approximates the allocation under the optimal policy)
in response to either real or ﬁnancial shocks is one with a weight on the growth of ﬁnancial
variables that is substantially higher than that on inﬂation, with no weight on output growth.
Overall, this result diﬀers substantially from the typical ﬁndings in the literature that the
optimal weight on ﬁnancial variables in optimized rules is either zero or orders of magnitude
smaller than the weight on inﬂation. We trace back the diﬀerence in results to the fact that
movements in asset prices in our economy imply large and ineﬃcient movements in natural
output that the policymaker can mitigate by leaning heavily on the growth rate of ﬁnancial
variables.
By modeling endogenous feedback loops through capital accumulation, our analysis of
optimal policy complements the recent contributions of Curdia and Woodford [2009] and par-
ticularly those of De Fiore and Tristani [2009] and Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian [2009].
De Fiore and Tristani [2009] study the optimal monetary policy in a model with costly state
veriﬁcation and price rigidity, but one in which there are no endogenous movements in net
worth, partly reﬂecting the absence of capital accumulation. They derive the loss function of
the central bank, which they show to depend on the volatility of the nominal interest rate and
credit spreads, in addition to the volatility of inﬂation and that of the output gap. They ﬁnd
that following a ﬁnancial shock, interest rates should be aggresively lowered but price stability
remains nearly optimal otherwise.
In contrast, Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian [2009] derive the optimal monetary policy
in an environment in which ﬁrms’ labor hiring is constrained by their net worth, as in the
model of Kiyotaki and Moore [1997]. They show that the central bank’s loss function is partly
a function of the tightness of the credit constraint, which they interpret as a risk premium.
Although their model abstracts from capital accumulation, it captures endogenous movements
4in net worth through movements in share prices of monopolistic sticky-price ﬁrms. They show
that stabilizing inﬂation is nearly optimal in their framework, even if the credit constraint is
quite severe, because the weight on inﬂation volatility in the central bank’s loss function dwarfs
that on the variability of the risk premium.
Our paper also relates to Faia and Monacelli [2007], who study the design of optimized
interest rate rules in response to technology and government spending shocks in a model with
agency costs adapted from the work of Carlstrom and Fuerst [1997]. Faia and Monacelli ﬁnd
that the optimal rule remains focused on stabilizing inﬂation. We complement their analysis
by emphasizing the design of optimal policies under ﬁnancial shocks.
T h er e m a i n d e ro ft h i sp a p e ri so r g a n i z e da sf o l l o w s .W eb r i e ﬂy present the main building
blocks of our model in the next section. We then describe the model’s calibration before
presenting our main results, emphasizing the importance of endogenous ﬂuctuations in asset
prices. We then discuss a simple and implementable speed-limit rule that closely approximates
the optimal policy and conduct a robustness analysis. The last section concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
Our analysis draws on BGG’s seminal work and on the more recent contributions of Christiano,
Motto, and Rostagno (CMR, 2003, 2010). The economy consists of four sectors. The ﬁrst two
sectors produce intermediate and ﬁnal goods, respectively, while the third produces physical
capital and the fourth provides loans to investors and can be interpreted as a pseudo-banking
sector. Banks in our framework are risk averse and hold a perfectly diversiﬁed portfolio of
entrepreneurial loans. The economy is populated by households composed of consumers and
workers and by entrepreneurs. The latter own the capital stock and provide capital services to
intermediate goods producers. Entrepreneurs ﬁnance their purchases of capital both with in-
ternal funds (own net worth) and external funds (bank loans). Entrepreneurs face idiosyncratic
productivity shocks and are subject to bankruptcy if their project fails. The banking sector
receives deposits from households (which are considered riskless and are thus remunerated as
such) and make loans to entrepreneurs. A key mechanism of the model is that the premium
5over the risk-free rate — the so-called external ﬁnance premium — that entrepreneurs must pay
to borrow is related to their leverage. The more “skin in the game” the entrepreneurs have,
the smaller is the moral hazard problem and the premium.
In the following, we describe the main building blocks of the model, which features a
traditional New Keynesian model augmented by a ﬁnancial accelerator following BGG and
CMR. More details can be found in the appendix and in CMR.
2.1 Main building blocks
2.1.1 Capital producers
A si nC M R ,t h e r ei sal a r g en u m b e ro fi d e n t i c a lcapital producers operating under perfect
competition who, at time , produce new physical capital +1 to be used in  +1 ,u s i n gt h e
following production function:









where  denotes investment,  is the depreciation rate 0 ≤  ≤ 1 and  is a capital adjustment
cost. The new capital stock is sold at price  and the old capital stock is purchased at price
e  on the capital market. Therefore, proﬁts are given by
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
 = +1 −  − e .
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There is a large number of heterogenous entrepreneurs, indexed by , who buy new capital
stock +1 at price  from the capital producers and transform it into capital services +1
6according to the linear technology:
+1 = +1 (3)
where  denotes the productivity of the transformation technology which is entrepreneur-
speciﬁc. The random variable  is drawn from a cumulative distribution denoted by ()=
( 6 ) with mean ()=1 . Entrepreneurial investment is risky and, as in CMR, the
degree of risk is assumed to vary over time. Therefore we assume that log() is normally
distributed with mean  and standard deviation . The standard deviation  is the
realization of a mean-preserving stochastic process referred to below as a “risk shock,” which
follows an AR(1) process with autoregressive coeﬃcient  and innovations,  assumed to
be normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation 
Each entrepreneur draws its type  after capital +1 has been purchased. To purchase
capital, each entrepreneur can either use her net worth +1 or borrow +1 from banks at the
gross rate of interest 
+1. To ensure that entrepreneurs do not accumulate enough net worth
to make the borrowing constraint nonbinding, we assume that entrepreneurs exit the economy
(close business) each period with probability 1 − .4 Within each period, entrepreneurs rent
their capital services to intermediate goods producers at the real price +1 a n da tt h ee n do f
the period they resell their capital stock to capital producers at price e 
Hence, entrepreneur ’s expected revenue from purchasing capital can be written as

h
+1+1+1 + e +1+1
i





+1+1 + e +1










4To maintain a constant population of entrepreneurs, we assume that 1 −  new entrepreneurs are born at
the same time. These entrepreneurs ﬁnance their purchases with a transfer, 
, that they receive from the
government. Departing entrepreneurs consume their net worth.
7To ﬁnance capital purchases, the entrepreneur can either use her net worth +1 or enter a
contract with a bank to borrow +1 at gross rate 
+1 such that
+1 = +1 + +1
T h ed e b tc o n t r a c tt h e ns p e c i ﬁes the loan amount +1 and the nominal gross rate 
+1.I f
the entrepreneur’s project is a success he pays back the loan and interest (
+1+1)t ot h e
bank. If the project fails (because the project’s productivity, , turns out to be too low) the
bank pays a proportional cost  to monitor the entrepreneur and conﬁscates the remaining









below which the entrepreneur declares bankruptcy.


















































Using the deﬁnition of the cutoﬀ value 
+1, and making use of the fact that +1 is decided












which deﬁnes the entrepreneur’s objective function.
82.1.3 Banks
Since the bank receives 
+1+1 if an entrepreneur’s productivity is higher than the cutoﬀ
value 
+1 and otherwise seizes all the entrepreneur’s assets 
+1+1 if the project fails

























Banks are assumed to be perfectly competitive and riskless. They ﬁnance themselves via
household deposits +1 that earn the nominal (risk-free) gross interest rate ,w h e r e is












which also corresponds to the bank’s participation constraint.
2.1.4 Aggregated net worth
The contract between a bank and an entrepreneur speciﬁes a level of loans, +1 and a gross
interest rate, 
+1 that maximizes the expected proﬁt of the entrepreneur in equation (6) sub-
ject to the bank’s participation constraint in equation (7), or identically a level of capital +1
and a cutoﬀ point 
+1. Clearly, the amount of loans and therefore the level of investment will
depend on entrepreneurs’ net worth +1 (the new state variable associated with asymmetric
information). Aggregating over all entrepreneurs, it can be shown (see Appendix and BGG for
details) that entrepreneurial net worth evolves according to
+1 = Ξ + 


where Ξ is the aggregate proﬁt ﬂow to entrepreneurs, and 
 is the government transfer to
"newly born" entrepreneurs. Following Gilchrist and Leahy [2002], we assume the entrepre-
neurs’ exogenous survival probability, , to be stochastic, representing a shock to net worth.
9The shock follows an AR(1) process with autoregressive coeﬃcient  and innovations, 
assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation 
2.1.5 Intermediate goods producers
Intermediate goods producers are monopolistically competitive. They produce an intermediate
good by means of capital and labor according to a constant return to scale production function:
 ()= ()
  ()
1− with  ∈ (01) (8)
where  () and  () respectively denote the physical capital and the labor input used by ﬁrm
 to produce  (),a n dw h e r e represents total factor productivity, which is assumed to follow
an AR(1) process with autoregressive coeﬃcient  and where the innovation,  is normally
d i s t r i b u t e dw i t hm e a nz e r o and standard deviation 
The ﬁrm determines its production plan to minimize its total cost :
min
{()()}
() +  ()
subject to production (8). As is standard in the New Keynesian literature, we assume that
ﬁrms set their prices according to Calvo’s staggering scheme and deﬁne  as the probability
that a particular ﬁrm is able to reset its price next period.
2.1.6 Final goods producers
Final goods are produced by competitive retailers that assemble intermediate goods according








with  ∈ [1∞)
where  stands for the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods and determines
the intermediate good producers’ market power (or the steady-state markup of price  over
their marginal costs).
102.1.7 Households
The representative household maximizes the discounted value of its lifetime utility that features



















subject to the budget constraint
 =  + Π + −1 − +1
where Π represents the dividends earned on the proﬁts of intermediate goods ﬁrms, 0 1
r e p r e s e n t st h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e ,a n d is a normalizing constant.
The household is also subject to the time endowment constraint
 +  =1 
where  denotes the proportion of total time dedicated to leisure.
2.2 Calibration
In our benchmark calibration, we assume that the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion,  is 1.5
and we set  to 1, implying a unit Frish elasticity of labor supply. We choose =0.99, leading
to an annual real interest rate of 4 percent.
Because of monopolistic competition, the steady state of the model is distorted, leading
to a gross markup of price over marginal costs, , equal to 1.1. We assume a capital share,
, of 36 percent in the Cobb-Douglas production function, and a quarterly depreciation rate
of 2.5 percent per quarter. We set the Calvo parameter, , to 0.75, so that, on average, ﬁrms
expect to be able to change their price once a year. Those parameter values also imply that
the economy’s steady-state capital-output ratio, 
, and investment-output ratio, 
, are in line
with estimations provided by CMR (2010) for the euro area (870;021)a n dt h eU n i t e dS t a t e s
(698;025). The equity to debt ratio, 
(−), implied by our calibration is closer to the lower
end of estimates reported by CMR (2010) for the euro area and the United States.
11The ﬁnancial intermediation block draws heavily on values assumed by CMR (2010) for
the United States and the euro area. The share of entrepreneurs who survive from one quarter
to the next, , is set to its U.S. value of 9762. We set the bank’s monitoring cost as a percent
of ﬁnal output, , to 40 percent, which lies between the U.S. estimate of 34 percent and that
of 53 percent in the euro area. The percent of businesses going bankrupt per quarter,  (),
is assumed to be 17.4 percent, between U.S. and euro area estimates ([034;053] for  and
[026;015] for  ()). These calibration choices lead to an annual external ﬁnance premium
(
 )o f22 percent in equilibrium.
For our simulation exercises in which we consider the three shocks simultaneously, we set
the parameters (, ,  and , , ) of the AR(1) processes to correspond to the
mode of the CMR (2010) Bayesian estimates for the United States. However, for simplicity
and ease of exposition, we will ﬁrst present our main results emphasizing the optimal monetary
policy response to single shocks. In this case, we set the standard deviations for each innovation
to 1 percent and set = =0 9 and  =0 5, in line with the CMR (2010) estimation results.
3 The results
In this section, we compute the optimal monetary policy under commitment following the time-
less perspective approach of Woodford [2003]. We ﬁrst do so assuming a distorted steady state,
that is, we derive the optimal policy assuming the presence of steady state markups that are
not oﬀset by lump-sum subsidies (see, for instance, Benigno and Woodford [2005]). We study
the responses to productivity and ﬁnancial shocks and contrast the optimal precommitment
policy to the traditional New Keynesian optimal benchmark, which consists of ensuring perfect
price stability. We show that the ﬁnancial friction introduces a policy trade-oﬀ that is espe-
cially acute in response to ﬁnancial shocks. We then highlight the importance of endogenous
ﬂuctuations in net worth and the role of asset prices by trimming down capital adjustment
costs so that asset prices barely move in response to shocks. In this case, a policy that perfectly
stabilizes prices is close to optimal. To study whether asset prices, interest rate spreads, or
leverage ratio targeting could play a role in the conduct of monetary policy, we simulate the
12economy under diﬀerent interest rate rules to which we append these alternative indicators and
verify whether any of them can get us close to the optimal allocation. Finally, we conclude by
conducting various robustness exercises on diﬀerent dimensions of the model. In particular, we
show that the large consensus around a policy of perfect price stabilization, even in the presence
of a ﬁnancial accelerator (see, for instance, Faia and Monacelli [2007]), is due to the assumption
that policymakers can compensate workers for the monopolistic competition distortion in a
lump-sum fashion.
3.1 Optimal monetary policy
Consider ﬁrst the impact of a positive productivity shock when monetary policy either is con-
ducted optimally or targets price stability.5 In the ﬁnancial accelerator model, higher produc-
tivity leads to higher asset prices, which increases entrepreneurs’ net worth and results in higher
investment. In turn, the increase in investment and output stimulates asset prices, which then
feed back into higher net worth and investment. Figure 1 shows that optimal policy tends to
dampen the response of the economy compared to a policy of perfect price stability (PPS), the
canonical New Keynesian benchmark. On impact the rise of asset prices under the optimal
policy is almost half of that under PPS, which in turn dampens the responses of net worth,
leverage, and the risk premium by similar magnitudes. At the same time, optimal policy allows
some ﬂuctuations in the inﬂation rate as policymakers trade oﬀ inﬂation stabilization for output
stabilization.
The optimal policy trade-oﬀ illustrated in Figure 1 means that there is an externality
associated with the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism: The ﬁnancial friction (monitoring cost)
gives rise to an overreaction of investment and output with respect to the eﬃcient allocation
that optimal policy takes into account. Figure 2 compares the eﬃcient responses to those
under either PPS or the optimal policy following a positive productivity shock.6 As in Figure
5Note that because we assume a noneﬃcient steady state, the natural allocation ensuring price stability is
not necessarily eﬃcient.
6The eﬃcient response is deﬁned as the response of the economy assuming no ﬁnancial friction, a lump
sum tax-ﬁnanced subsidy that oﬀsets the monopolistic competition distortion in the steady state, and perfectly
ﬂexible prices.
131, under the optimal policy the rise in net worth and equity is more muted than under PPS.
Fewer investment projects are ﬁnanced which aligns the response of the economy more closely
with the eﬃcient allocation where ﬁnancial frictions are absent.
Although the diﬀerence between optimal and perfect inﬂation-targeting policies remains
relatively small following a productivity shock, the departure from price stability becomes much
more pronounced when the economy is hit by ﬁnancial shocks. Because ﬁnancial shocks interfere
directly in the ﬁnancial intermediation process, they have a more direct bearing on asset prices,
net worth, and ﬁnance premia than productivity shocks. We focus here on two diﬀerent shocks.
The ﬁrst is a “risk” shock, i.e., an innovation to the cross-sectional distribution of entrepreneurs’
individual productivity (a -shock). A drop in  is to be interpreted as a decrease in the
perception of market risk, which aﬀects risk premia directly (see Christiano et al. [2010]).7 As
in the case of a productivity shock, optimal policy leans against movements in asset prices and
net worth, but the diﬀerence between optimal policy and perfect inﬂation targeting is much
starker. As Figure 3 shows, a 1 percent decrease in  leads to a persistent increase in output
and investment when policy is directed exclusively at price stability (PPS). In contrast, the
output hike is only temporary under the optimal monetary policy. The stance of policy is more
restrictive — as reﬂected in the sudden tightening of real interest rates — dampening equity prices
and avoiding the swelling of net worth that occurs under PPS. Overall, by leaning against the
jump in asset prices, optimal monetary policy avoids the investment spree that characterizes
the solution under PPS, but requires a temporary drop in inﬂation.
Interestingly, since optimal policy prevents an increase in entrepreneurs’ net worth, lever-
aging is larger than under PPS despite lower investment.8 Optimal policy limits the amplitude
of investment ﬂuctuations that arise out of the ﬁnancial accelerator’s externality by leaning
against asset prices. However, as banks are perfectly safe in the model (risk is perfectly diver-
siﬁed), there is no concern about the amount of leverage in the economy.
The second ﬁnancial shock that we consider is an innovation to net worth (a -shock),
7The analysis is almost isomorphic for shocks to net worth (or -shocks) that are central to the analysis in
Gilchrist and Leahy [2002]. However, as explained in Christiano et al. [2010], these shocks have counterfactual
implications for credit growth and are therefore less likely to be primary drivers of the business cycle.
8Under our calibration, optimal policy actually engineers a decrease in net worth.
14which is central to the analysis in Gilchrist and Leahy [2002]. This shock can be interpreted as
a nonfundamental increase in asset prices, which, like a negative -shock, implies a decrease in
moral hazard and a boost in asset prices, investment, and output. Figure 4 shows that, again,
optimal policy tends to dampen movements in asset prices, net worth and ﬁnance premia
compared to perfect price stability, which leads to more output stability in the medium run.
The eﬃcient economy (no monopolistic competition and no price or ﬁnancial frictions) is not
aﬀected by ﬁnancial shocks: output, consumption, and labor are constant. Because of the
policy trade-oﬀ mentioned above, however, optimal monetary policy reaches a middle ground
between perfect price stability and constant output.
3.2 Role of asset prices
How important are movements in asset prices in determining the optimal monetary response?
To isolate the eﬀect of ﬂuctuations in asset prices via the ﬁnancial accelerator, we trim down
the capital adjustment cost in equation (1). Mechanically, when investment is not costly, asset
prices (Tobin’s Q) do not need to increase by much to induce the required level of investment;
in our example, asset prices remain almost ﬁxed. Figure 5 shows the response of the econ-
omy to positive productivity, -, and -shocks under the optimal policy (solid line) and PPS
(dashed line) when the asset prices transmission channel is shut oﬀ. Comparing Figures 1 and
5 demonstrates that endogenous ﬂuctuations in asset prices and their impact on net worth are
ﬁrst order in determining the optimal monetary response to shocks. When asset prices do not
move (as in Figure 5) optimal monetary policy is virtually identical to a policy targeting price
stability, as the wedge between natural and eﬃcient output remains almost constant.
This result again highlights the importance of the "multiplier eﬀects" of asset prices on
investment, i.e., the feedback loop through which an increase in asset prices boosts investment
via a rise in net worth and a corresponding drop in the external ﬁnance premium. This dynamic
eﬀect pushes the economy to deviate substantially from the eﬃcient allocation and price stability
is not the best solution in terms of welfare.
153.3 Implementing the optimal policy
One problem with welfare-based optimal policies is that they rely on unobservables such as the
eﬃcient level of output or various shadow prices, which, in practice, makes them diﬃcult to
implement. A straightforward alternative is to rely on simple but suboptimal rules that are
functions of observables only. Previous literature (see Walsh [2003]) has shown that the optimal
precommitment monetary policy rule can be approximated by a simple inertial policy rule — or
speed-limit rule — in the New Keynesian context. In particular, just as optimal policies with
commitment, a speed-limit rule that lean on the change in the output gap can introduce inertia
into output and inﬂa t i o nt h a tw o u l do t h e r w i s eb ea b s e n tw i t ho t h e rt y p e so fs i m p l er u l e s .T o
take into account the extra friction due to the ﬁnancial accelerator, we also append commonly
accepted measures of ﬁnancial excesses and postulate the following general speciﬁcation:
b  = gd  + g (b  − d −1)+g
³
c  − [ −1
´
.( 9 )
where variables with a hat denote deviations from steady state and c  i so u ri n d i c a t o ro f
ﬁnancial excess. We consider a rule in which we set this indicator to equal the external ﬁnance
premium. However, our results are robust to alternative measures such as equity prices, net
worth, or loans because they are all interrelated via the optimal debt contract between banks
and entrepreneurs. The general rule relies on a reasonable information set, as only the growth
rates of the variables are required. Using equation (9), we search for the simple rule that
best matches the optimal precommitment plan. To do so, we rely on the following distance
minimization algorithm deﬁned over the  impulse response functions of  variables of interest
to the policymakers. The algorithm searches the space of parameters ,  and  that




0 (() − )
16where () is an ×1 vector of impulses under the postulated simple interest rate rule,
and  is its counterpart under the optimal plan.9 The algorithm matches the responses of
12 variables (, , , , , ,  = 
, ,  ≡


,  ≡ 
, , )o v e ra3 0
quarters period using constrained versions of the simple rule (9)where  =(   )
0.
Figures 6, 7, and 8 show impulse responses to a productivity shock, , a risk shock, ,
and a net worth shock, , respectively, under the optimal plan, the optimized speed-limit rule,
and a traditional Taylor rule. Table 2 reports the value of the parameters of the optimized
rule for the diﬀerent exercises.10 The optimized rule leans strongly against inﬂation (because of
the price friction) and the change in risk premium (because of the ﬁnancial friction), but does
n o tr e a c tt ot h ec h a n g ei no u t p u t(  =0 ). Moreover, the ﬁnancial friction is quantitatively
important and leads the monetary authority to place a larger weight on ﬁnancial excesses than
on movements in inﬂation. Figures 6, 7, and 8 show that our speed-limit rule reproduces very
closely the allocation generated under the optimal policy and particularly leads to inertial,
hump-shaped, movements in many variables. In contrast, the standard Taylor rule often misses
on the level of the variables’ responses and typically doesn’t generate hump-shaped movements.
The importance of leaning against ﬁnancial excesses is highlighted in Figure 9 by showing
the allocations in response to each shock when the weight on the growth of the ﬁnancial indicator
in the speed-limit rule is reduced compared to that in the optimized rule. The ﬁgure shows that
a larger weight on the change in  helps create inertial responses, particularly for investment
and output. When the policymaker leans less against changes in the risk premium, investment
responds too much too quickly, which leads to suboptimal movements in consumption (not
shown) and output.
As a ﬁnal exercise, we also searched for the parameters of the speed-limit rule that best
match the optimal plan when the three shocks are considered simultaneously. The result, shown
9Another possibility is to search within a predetermined space of simple interest rate rules for the one that
minimizes the central bank loss function (see, e.g., Söderlind, 1999, and Dennis, 2004). However because diﬀerent
combinations of output gaps and inﬂation variability could in principle produce the same welfare loss, we rely
on a more stringent exercise consisting of matching impulse response functions.
10Note also that similar results would be obtained with rules that lean against other ﬁnancial variables such
as equity prices, net worth, or loans because they are all interrelated via the optimal debt contract between
banks and entrepreneurs.
17in the last row of Table 2, is qualitatively similar to the individual shock exercises presented in
Figures 6 to 8.
Finally, note that our results are qualitatively similar if instead we ﬁnd the optimized
rule by minimizing the distance between welfare under the optimal policy and welfare under
the rule. In fact, using our procedure, the level of welfare under the optimized rule ends up
matching that under the optimal policy. In contrast, a policy of perfect price stability implies




Most authors routinely assume that the governement is able to levy a lump-sum tax and trans-
fer the proceeds to workers in the form of an employment subsidy that compensates them for
the welfare loss associated with the steady-state monopolistic competition distortion. This as-
sumption makes the equilibrium under ﬂexible prices eﬃcient and, under certain conditions (see
Woodford [2003]), optimal monetary policy delivers the ﬂexible price allocation (or constant
markups and prices). Although this assumption is innocuous in a canonical New Keynesian
model where the only other distortion is price stickiness (since the wedge between eﬃcient and
natural output is constant), it can have important consequences when the economy is simul-
taneously subject to another real friction, like the countercyclical credit market imperfections
inherent to the ﬁnancial accelerator model.
In general, the ﬂexible price allocation does not maximize household welfare when there is
a nontrivial real friction and when the steady-state markup is non-zero.11 Figure 10 shows the
gap between the eﬃcient and natural responses of output to productivity and ﬁnancial shocks.
It appears that the wedge between natural and eﬃcient output is not constant under ﬂexible
prices, which opens up the door to welfare-improving monetary policy under sticky prices. In
this case, the optimal policy trades some output variability against movements in inﬂation.
11See Adao, Correia, and Teles (2003) for a formal analysis in the context of a monetary model with cash-in-
advance constraints and ﬁrms that set prices one period in advance.
18As shown in Galí, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido [2007], however, the welfare loss from output
ﬂuctuations is increasing in the amount of steady-state distortion. In the case of a subsidized
steady state, the welfare loss associated with ineﬃcient output variations is dwarfed by the
welfare cost of inﬂation, and price stability may remain the welfare-maximizing policy. Figure
11 shows that, indeed, the optimal policy response to productivity, -, and γ−shocks is to
aim at perfect price stability when a subsidy is available to oﬀset the steady-state monopolistic
competition distortion.
As in Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian [2009] and Faia and Monacelli [2007], who also
assume a nondistorted steady state, we ﬁnd that welfare is mostly aﬀected by inﬂation variability
and that consequently policymakers follow a policy of quasi price stability.
3.4.2 Inﬂation protected deposits
Christiano et al. [2010] emphasize the importance of the so-called "debt-deﬂation eﬀect" for
the transmission of real and ﬁnancial shocks in a model with ﬁnancial frictions. Under optimal
monetary policy, however, assuming that household bank deposits are protected against surprise
inﬂation (like in BGG) or not (like in CMR) is almost irrelevant in terms of welfare. Figure
12 shows the response of the economy to a risk shock under optimal policy in both instances.
The main diﬀerence concerns the entrepreneur’s leverage ratio. Because the shock is slightly
inﬂationary, it tends to boost net worth, equity prices, and loans in the case of a CMR contract.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The ﬁnancial crisis has forced policymakers and academics to revisit to role of ﬁnancial vari-
ables in the conduct of monetary policy. Our work is in this vein and shows that in the seminal
framework of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist [1999] there is a strong impetus for the optimal
monetary policy to lean against movements in asset prices in response to either real or ﬁnancial
shocks. Our result hinges on the presence of two reasonable, though often overlooked, condi-
tions. First, the natural allocation must diﬀer from the eﬃcient one, with a wedge between
the two that varies along the business cycle. This naturally occurs in the model when we re-
19alistically abstract from the presence of employment subsidies to monopolistic ﬁrms. Second,
we show that the presence of an endogenous feedback loop between asset prices and economic
ﬂuctuations is also crucial for our results. Absent that feedback, a policy of strict inﬂation
targeting is the optimal prescription for monetary policy.
We also show that in practice the optimal monetary policy can be well approximated
by a speed-limit interest rate rule that places a large weight on deviations of inﬂation from a
target and on the growth rate of ﬁnancial variables. We have emphasized changes in the risk
premia in our speed-limit rule. However, as has been suggested by many policymakers during
the crisis, leaning against the growth rate of credit would also closely approximate the optimal
policy and improve on a policy of strict inﬂation targeting.
In our analysis, we abstracted from the presence of ﬁnancial constraints on banks and
other ﬁnancial institutions, which clearly played an important role in the ﬁnancial turmoil of the
past three years. We conjecture that qualitatively our results would also hold in a model with
those features (see Gertler and Karadi [2009], Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010], or Brunnermeier
and Sannikov [2011] for models with constraints on ﬁnancial institutions). Nevertheless, the
extent to which the optimal policy leans against changes in ﬁnancial variables or which one is a
better guide for monetary policy may very well depend on whether or not ﬁnancial institutions
also face ﬁnancial constraints. We intend to pursue this avenue in future research.
20Appendix I: The contract (not for publication)
The contract speciﬁes a level of loans, +1 and a gross interest rate 
+1 that maximizes
the expected proﬁt of the entrepreneur subject to the participation constraint of the ﬁnancial
intermediary (the bank), or identically a level of capital and a cutoﬀ point.
To simplify matters, it is convenient to operate certain substitutions.12 Let us ﬁrst
introduce:















































































12Note that we consider the steady-state contract only. As  takes the form of a “risk shock” in certain
simulations presented, the equations must be updated accordingly.





































+1+1 = (+1 − +1)
The CSV problem therefore amounts to ﬁnding a cutoﬀ point 


























+1+1 = (+1 − +1)
Denoting by Ψ+1 the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint, and remembering
that 
+1 is indexed by each possible 













































+1+1 − (+1 − +1)
¢¤
=0
















































































+1+1 − (+1 − +1)=0 
It is clear from the ﬁrst equation that 
+1 only depends on 
+1 and . Therefore, we have

+1 = 
































+1+1 − (+1 − +1)=0  (11)
Appendix II: Aggregation (not for publication)
This section discusses the evolution of aggregate net worth, denoted by +1.A tt h i ss t a g ei t





Recalling that the capital stock held by an individual  is a function of individual net worth, it






































+1+1 − (+1 − +1)=0  (13)
We now turn our attention to the law of motion of aggregate net worth. Let us denote
by Ξ the average actual proﬁt of an individual entrepreneur in period 






















Since entrepreneurs are randomly drawn for survival with probability , and newly born en-
trepreneurs receive a transfer 
 from the government, aggregate net worth evolves as











The (1 − ) entrepreneurs selected to close their business consume a constant share  of









24Appendix III: Risk (not for publication)
In this Appendix we come back to the determination of . Recall that we use a log—normal
















Making the change of variable  =
−



































Making a ﬁrst change of variable  =
−






























































Note ﬁnally that ()=1imposes  = −
2

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Households and production
Discount rate  0990
Frisch elasticity  1000
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution  1500
Depreciation rate on capital  0025
Capital share  0361
Steady-state gross markup  1100
Calvo parameter  0750
Financial intermediation
Entrepreneur’s survival probability  97620
Monitoring cost  04
Percent of bankrupt business p/quarter  ()0 174
Rental rate on capital (gross p/quarter)  1015










AR(1) coeﬃcients ;; 09;05;09
Standard deviations ;; 001;001;001
Shock processes: Christiano et al. (2010), US
AR(1) coeﬃcients ;; 0883;0529;0821
Standard deviations ;; 0005;0005;005
29Table 2. Optimized Interest-Rate Rule
Parameters
Shocks   
TFP 48 0 002 1 087
Risk 42 7 501 0 078
Net Worth 45 5 201 0 765
All shocks 45 0 001 1 651
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Figure 1: Responses to a Productivity Shock Under the Optimal Policy (Optimal) and Perfect
Price Stability (PPS).











































Figure 2: Responses to a Productivity Shock Under the Optimal Policy (Optimal), Perfect
Price Stability (PPS) and the Eﬃcient Allocation (Eﬃcient)






































































Figure 3: Responses to the Cross-Sectional Distribution of Entrepreneurs’ Productivity Under
the Optimal Policy (Optimal) and Perfect Price Stability (PPS)





































































Figure 4: Responses to a Shock to Entrepreneurs’ Net Worth Under the Optimal Policy (Op-
timal) and Perfect Price Stability (PPS)



























































































Figure 5: Responses to All Shocks Under the Optimal Policy (Optimal) and Perfect Price
Stability (PPS): No Investment Adjustment Costs








































































Figure 6: Optimized Speed-Limit Rule: Productivity Shock








































































Figure 7: Optimized Speed-Limit Rule: Risk Shock





































































Figure 8: Optimized Speed-Limit Rule: Net Worth Shock











































































































Figure 9: Varying the Weight on the Indicator of Financial Excess













































































Figure 10: Output Gaps Responses to Productivity and Financial Shocks





















































































Figure 11: Responses to Productivity and Financial Shocks: Eﬃcient Steady-State
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Figure 12: Responses to a Productivity Shock Under the Optimal Policy: Inﬂation Protected
(BGG) vs Nominal (CMR) Contracts
42